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SPACE STATION FREEDOM
SAFETY PROGRAM

John -G. Griggs, III
Chief, Safety Division
Space Station Freedom Program Office
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA has adopted new procedures for
the traditional analyses efforts
and incorporated new quantitative
assessment methods on the Space
Station Freedom Program. NASA is
working with the International
Partners to insure that their
equivalent
practice
to
our
methodology, and the result, is
acceptable and achievable.

ABSTRACT

This paper begins with a renewed
safety consciousness within NASA.
There
is
focused
management
emphasis on the incorporation of
firmly established safety design
requirements and evolving
new
Safety
analysis
techniques,
including the quantitative safety
risk assessment methods. We as an
Agency must do our very best to
preclude another accident.

The status of that work, and
discussion of agreements still
needed, are the focus of this
report.

Further discussed is the framework
for the Space Station Freedom
Safety Program.
This framework
provides for integration of the
partial safety analysis performed
by the numerous NASA Centers and
the International Partners into a
Programmatic Safety Assessment for
each of the launch increments as
well as the complete Space Station
Freedom on orbit.

TEXT

History has documented that the
NASA had fallen into the sofamiliar pattern of "disregard of
the situation" (just as you might
with your power saw at home).
History
has
also shown
that
Reliability's Failure Modes And
Effects Analysis (FMEA), as well as
the various safety analyses which
key from the FMEA as a starting
point had become an historical
record rather than analyses which
drive design.

INTRODUCTION

The Space Station Freedom is on a
course to effect the agreements
necessary to implement, early on,
a program-wide safety program. The
safety program includes carefully
reviewed and tailored requirements
for a) design, and b) safety
analysis efforts which can then be
integrated
to
develop
the
programmatic risk assessment for
the Program Director. Internally,

It is fair to say that over time
the significance of the safety
input to decisions concerning
manned space flight diminished.
This has been well documented in
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the various commission reports.
I judge this in part because of the
quality of the safety input to the
decisions diminished and in part
because of the management attention
Jointly,
to the safety program.
management
the
hand- in-hand,
attention and the quality of the
safety program eroded until the
safety effort was "silent" and the
management recognition was absent.

Operating Hazards Analyses which
consider the operator and other
environment factors.
The NASA is now incorporating a
more rigorous analysis methodology.
Quantitative analysis techniques
developed in the chemical and
being
are
industries
nuclear
evaluated and applied now to some
efforts.
On the Space Station Freedom
and
defining
are
Program we
implementing a safety program which
insure the safe launch,
will
of
operation
year
30
and
assembly,
a manned base, and unmanned free
The safety
flying platforms.
program includes requirements for
a) design, and b) analysis of the
A
evolving design for hazards.
part of the analysis is the
identification of "hazard control
requirements" which in the early
program phases are derived design
requirements.

We are springing vigorously off of
this renewed intensity in the
development of the SRM&QA program
for the Space Station Freedom
Not to diminish the
Program.
efforts of those involved in the
resumption of the manned space
flight on the shuttle program, we
on the Space Station Freedom have
the opportunity (the obligation) to
build a program which will not
require revamping in the late
1990's.
We in the NASA have now taken steps
to insure that the FMEA and the
safety analysis will be in the
correct time frame relative to the
design milestones, and will impact
that design.

We have in place today the initial
set of safety design requirements,
Program
the
in
documented
Requirements
and
Definition
Document (PDRD). We further have
defined an updated and workable
the
performing
for
process
safety
qualitative
traditional
The NASA level III
analyses.
Centers have agreed to use a common
process and format for the analysis
and the worksheet as we 1 I as the
formal report.

For the NSTS program, the FMEA and
safety analyses have been redesign
and many
accomplished,
Further,
changes have resulted.
where a safety risk has been
accepted, it has been done in a
systematic manner, with the Program
know1edgeab1e
mak1ng
D i rector
decisions.

We are now in the process of
providing a program-wide electronic
data base which will make the
hazard data available to all who
may be affected, and allows for
feedback by the affected party.
in the severity
This assists
categorization and development of
hazard control requirements.

the
revisited
also
NASA has
techniques for performing these
safety analyses, and has linked
them in a manner which will improve
The
the result in the future.
Preliminary Hazards Analyses fed
into the detailed Subsystem Hazards
with
these,
Analyses,. - and
unresolved hazards, carry into the
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Within the NASA this data base will
reside
in .the
Technical
and
Management
Information
System
(TMIS) which is a SSF program-wide
host system for data bases.
The next advancement, now in work,
will
be
to
incorporate
the
Quantitative J?isk Assessment (QRA)
analysis process. The goal is to
implement the QRA process in a
manner which uses the FMEA and the
qualitative hazards analyses as the
input, and extends these WHERE
REQUIRED
into
more
in-depth
analyses.

estimated loss should the hazard
occur in one of the manifestation
modes which is possible. Since we
seldom know
that
value,
the
application
of
statistical
confidence limits is appropriate.
A risk function, be it a simple
multiplication
of
the
three
factors, or some more complex
function, can be used to establish
a safety risk assessment.
Development of the criteria to
determine when the additional, more
rigorous analysis is required is
under way and should be completed
during the first quarter of 1989.
It seems clear that at a minimum,
any
residual
risk
which
is
categorized
as
catastrophic
requires this additional knowledge
of causal factors, probability of
occurrence,
and
definition of
damage states.

This is an advancement over the
qualitative hazard analysis in
several ways.
First, it is more
rigorous in the "What can go
wrong?" portion of the qualitative
analysis.
This leads to a more
complete hazard analysis, should
the process be allowed to stop
there.

As with the standard methodology
for the qualitative safety hazards
analyses, the QRA analytical method
will be standard across the NASA
portion of the Space Station
Freedom program.
This technique,
too, will utilize the TMIS system
for housing a master data base with
the QRA models and fault tree
analyses. The QRA model data base
will link to the engineering data
base
for
FMEA
data,
thereby
Insuring the accuracy of the data,
and use of common data.

The next step is to determine the
likelihood of the occurrence. This
is done in a detailed manner by the
construction of a fault tree
composed of the events which can
lead up to the occurrence of the
undesi red event descr i bed i n the
scenario. The fault tree is first
built in a qualitative manner,
describing the combinations of
events which could cause the
Hazard.
The additional benefit is that the
undes i red
events
can
now
be
attached with a likelihood of
occurrence, which we did before
(but now with the application of
statistical
confidence limits).
The overall fault tree can then be
"summed" giving the hazard scenario
a likelihood of occurrence (with
confidence limits) and a damage
estimate ($).

This brings the discussion to the
International Partners and how they
will interface with or use these
processes.
The U.S. NASA commitment to the
Space Station Freedom Program is to
build the core station, and to
perform the integration of the
portions built by the International
Partners.
The NASA core station
involves the efforts of six NASA

The damage estimate is "simply" the
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requirements and safety analysis
A positive spirit of
processes.
the
allowing
is
cooperation
development of compatibility in

Centers, building the electrical
power system, the habitant module
and the U.S. laboratory module, as
well as the truss assembly and the
logistics module for servicing and
crew re-supply.

All of the effort to date within
the NASA portion of the SSF program
in standardizing the analysis
methodology and the timing of the
application has been shared with
This
the International Partners.
is also true of the studies of the
QRA, together with the criteria for
its application.

These centers have agreed to use
analysis processes
the safety
described above.
The three International Partners,
each charged with building a
significant element of the space
station, currently have their own
engineering and management systems.
These include the European Space
Agency, who builds the ESA attached
laboratory module; the Japanese
Space Agency, who also builds an
experiment laboratory, an outside
space exposure deck, and the remote
manipulator arm to service the
experiments; and Canada, who is
mobile
the
for
responsible
This system
servicing system.
includes the remote manipulator
capability designed to assemble the
space station during the assembly
stages.

Each of the three partners have
likewise shared their proposed
safety analyses methodologies with
the other International Partners.
We all recognize that control of
hazards and their possible effects
requires analysis efforts which
cross the international interfaces.
We can be sure that the hazard and
feel
not
will
effects
the
constrained by the international
interfaces; therefore, we must
insure that the analysis is not so
constrained.
What has been outlined above is the
first step in achieving this treaty
requirement; that of developing
good analysis requirements, and
insuring, by exchange of process
information, that the similar (if
processes will
identical)
not
produce equivalent results.

Clearly, the International Partner
elements are critical to the manned
life support, and in the case of
Canada, to the assembly of Space
Station Freedom itself.
By Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), the International Partners
agree to "meet or exceed" the
requirements the NASA applies to
the U.S. portion of the space
station. In the safety arena, this
is true of both the design
requirements and the analysis
requirements for identifying and
mitigating hazards.

Further, the community of the NASA
International
three
the
and
working through the
Partners,
are
above,
exchange described
adopting data form and formats as
similar as our differing systems
As the ESA safety
will allow.
manager says: "That is not a
requirement, but it certainly makes
our job easier".

Below the level of the MOU, the
actual workings of the safety
program between all partners can
only be insured by the use of
design
(or equivalent)
common

As the safety design requirements
and the analysis process methods,
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be they identical or similar, they
must be documented in the Joint
PDRD, which Is a joint requirements
document between each International
Partner and the NASA.
This
document,
too,
is
under
configuration
control
by
both
partners.

or acceptance.
During the periodic reviews which
document and review the safety risk
model, a board, composed of all
affected agencies, must review the
risk elements and jointly recommend
disposition to management. This is
the only manner in which we can
insure that the risk is truly
understood.

Once the analysis tools and the
basic set of safety requirements
are agreed to and implemented, the
safety data flow between the
international partners and the NASA
must be unimpeded. The electronic
data bases of the partners must be
compatible with that of the NASA
THIS. While we must remain mindful
of
the
U.S.
Dept
of
State
requirement to oversee Technology
Transfer,
we
MUST
achieve
unrestricted flow of the safety
data to a) understand the hazards,
and b) mitigate the hazards or the
effects. The system described above
will insure the daily hazards data
interchange.

At these periodic safety risk
reviews,
one parameter to be
studied is the consistency of the
safety data.
The job jointly
belongs to the safety community to
insure that the thoroughness of the
analyses is maintained, as we are
all affected bv the outcomes.
The
additional
check
on
the
compliance with the agreed to
design and analysis requirements is
a process for "audit", or "survey"
of the system to assess compliance.
Any deviation or non-compliance
must be identified and rectified.

At major milestone reviews through
the Critical Design Review (CDR),
and then more often, the integrated
safety
assessment
must
be
documented and reviewed by the
safety community and then with
program management.

Within
the
NASA,
there
are
established processes for audits.
The process details of how this
activity can be accomplished across
the
interface
and
into
the
International
partners'
program
have not been defined and agreed to
as yet.

That is not to say that a given
issue must wait for the periodic
review; a specific issue must be
worked in its turn, and taken to
program
management
with
the
engineering
request
for
requirements change, deviation, or
waiver; and the associated safety
risk acceptance of residual risk.
Safety engi neeri ng
accept the safety
program; that risk,
germane
program
schedule, and cost
given to the program
decisions on safety

SUMMARY

Space Station Freedom is the
largest
international
space
endeavor
undertaken
since
the
beginning of space exploration.
Building a diverse, distinctive and
international Safety Program and
Safety Community on the Space
Station Freedom Program will be
challenging.
Within the safety
community,
the
individual
dedication
is
allowing
the
accomplishment of required goals
and objectives.

can no longer
risk for the
along with the
performance,
data, must be
management for
risk reduction
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painstaking
Concurrently,
examination to detail and careful
documentation of the Space Station
Freedom requirements are being
implemented and are mandatory for
success.
Communication in the safety program
state-of-the-art
utilize
will
software and computers, which will
provide broad accessibility to
safety information among the NASA
and the International Partners.
Safety information flow will be a
integrating and
for
tool
key
achieving a safely designed Space
Station Freedom and disseminating
assessment
safety
integrated
results.
There have been joint NASA projects
with other nations, but the Space
Station Freedom Program brings a
and
complexity
of
level
new
successful
for
challenge
integration of the United States,
Canada, Japan and the European
Space Agency. This integration to
Freedom
Station
Space
ensure
success will assuredly advance the
science of safety engineering,
human engineering and quantitative
risk assessment in space.
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